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The Public-Private

Good

Forum:

Randomize Behavior

Intentions

Robert Wood

Public and private institutions of higher learning coexist throughout the United States in a
pattern of diversity that

is

unknown

in

any other postindustrial society— and Massachu-

a prime example of U.S. pluralism in education. In an era of scarce resources and
mounting costs, the contrary instincts for cooperation and competition are at work. This
setts is

an account of a voluntary attempt among private and public colleges and univerbetween 1973 and 1976 to forge a fragile partnership— the Massachusetts Public-

article is
sities

Forum— which first flourished, then foundered. Tracing the course of its early
and final failure may help shape present education policy, as Massachusetts
tries to find a common ground for a partnership between the public and private sectors.

Private

successes

Always pray
toward

that

your opposition be wicked. In wickedness there

rationality.

Therefore there

is

a strong strain

always the possibility, in theory, of handling the

is

wicked by outthinking them.
Corollary One: Good intentions randomize behavior.
Corollary Two: Good intentions are far more difficult to cope with than malicious
behavior.

— Marion

J.

Levy,

Jr.

Laws of the Disillusionment of the True Liberal

The

institutional

mosaic by which the United States educates

its

young

is

one of the

great unnatural wonders of the world. In so-called plain education— kindergarten

through twelfth grade— some 16,000 local education authorities
exist with

in the public sector co-

3,600 private schools. In higher education, 1,700 public universities and col-

leges stand alongside almost 1,400 private colleges and universities, although three out of

four students in the nation attend public institutions.

The extraordinary mix of public and
national structure of education

private institutions stands in sharp contrast to the

common

in all other so-called

advanced nations. Foreign

Robert Wood, Henry R. Luce Professor of Democratic Institutions and the Social Order at Wesleyan University,
was formerly president of the University of Massachusetts (1970-78) and under secretary and secretary of

HUD

(1966-69).

visitors looking at

our array of schools and colleges, observed the

nant of Harvard, often conclude that "this

"But

replied,

it

works; most of us like

it;

is

James Bryant Co-

late

not a system, but chaos." To which Conant

and

it

appears to be as permanent ... as most

of our political institutions."'
Apparently, permanent coexistence

uing interaction
in the

among

among

the several parts.

separate parties implies

Sometimes

work of the College Board, which serves

More often today,

to college.

it

takes the

as gatekeeper in

as college costs soar

some

and the college-age cohort

blamed

their

demise on the public

in the

popu-

Every year, private

lation dwindles, competition is the principal feature of the relationship.

colleges unwillingly expire, having

sort of contin-

form of collaboration, as
the transition from school

Independent

sector.

universities vie with public ones in the search for research funds. Public

and private ad-

mission offices engage in "marketing strategies" to attract the best and the brightest.

For a generation,

state

governments have struggled, with uneven success,

to put in place

coordinating and governing boards that could rationalize the missions and better allocate

resources between the public and private sectors. Professional associations have worked
to fashion

arrangements that

at least

provide rules of the road in the contest for students

and money. Independent universities and colleges, fearing government "intrusion," and
public ones jealous of the historic prestige of elite private institutions and suspicious of
their claim

on publicly supported student aid occasionally

try their

hand

at treaty

making,

bringing to mind the "spheres of influence" strategy of colonial empires.
In no state has the battle between the public and private institutions of higher education

raged more fiercely than in Massachusetts. The concentration of first-rate, prestigious
is greatest here. Public institutions are Johnny-comeMidwest and western counterparts. They play catch-up with
brashness, and occasional crudity that mark newcomers to an enterprise. If

private universities and colleges

compared

latelies

the vigor,

there

to their

all

a laboratory to test the prospects for collaboration, to determine the costs of un-

is

bridled competition, and to explore the feasibility of comprehensive education oversight

and planning, short of state domination and

dictation,

it is

the

Commonwealth of Massa-

chusetts.

This

is

a report on one such experiment that took place in the Massachusetts laboratory

about a decade ago. The article was prepared
leaders in education, business, and industry

initially for the

Alden Seminars, a group of

who meet to discuss major

issues in higher

education and to identify areas for action and possible solutions for problems. The discussion treats the experience of the Massachusetts Public-Private

Forum, a voluntary cooper-

among public and private institutions of higher education that flourished,
foundered in the years 1973-76. The Forum's purpose was to forge a common front

ative endeavor

then

for higher education in the state, presenting a united claim in the allocation of scarce

resources during a time

members,

in the

professional capabilities

important instances, the
fell

when

those resources were increasingly hard to

overwhelming majority, were men and women of good

apart, even while similar associations in other states— such as

What

follows then,

Its

and high

who increasingly came to respect and like one another. In two
Forum achieved consensus on important policy matters. Then it

Pennsylvania— held together. The question
is

come by.
will

is,

of course,

New

York,

Illinois,

and

why?

drawn from imperfect documentation and more imperfect memory,

a plausible but not definitive reconstruction of the rise and

fall

of the Massachusetts

Forum. Successive sections characterize the environment in which higher
education operated in the mid-1970s, and the key features of the system of higher education then. They trace the evolution of the Forum with at least chronological accuracy,
Public-Private
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describing

its

climb to the mountaintop of the "spirit of Williamstown" and the descent to

the Worcester massacre.

The

suggest reflectively what went

last sections

lessons there are for today. But the reader must

remember

wrong and what

that these conclusions are those

of a workaday political economist temporarily posing as a historian and painfully aware of

how

the historian

would judge the

The Environment: The Dreary

effort.

Seventies

All through the sixties, higher education in Massachusetts was on a roll. Enrollments

swelled as postwar baby boomers

came

of age. Federal support for research and develop-

ment, the student aid programs of the Great Society, liberal
institutions,

cient

lege

and the

first sizable

endowment drives

for

state appropriations for public

many

private ones provided suffi-

and occasionally ample resources. Civil-rights legislation released the pent-up col-

demands for minorities. Capital outlays for new campuses, classrooms, and laborawere often authorized even before architects completed plans. The times were

tories

golden.

However, foresighted observers such as Joseph Healey, chairman of the University of
Massachusetts Board of Trustees, knew that the bloom was coming off the rose.

By

the

end of the decade, continued student protests over Vietnam and inept academic responses

them startled a public once wholeheartedly committed to education, then soured it. The
Columbia University riot in 1968, the Harvard Bust in 1969, the march on MIT's Draper
Labs in 1969, Kent State in 1970, and the resulting campus upheavals across the country
signaled an abrupt halt in the academic march to a bigger and better promised land. These
events distracted academic administrators from ordinary concerns. They diverted all
to

energies to the simple maintenance of law and order and to

opinion increasingly confused and outraged

at the

damage

control of a public

turn of events.

Unlike Joseph Healey, most college and university leaders were slow to recognize the

changing times. Preoccupied with the tasks of restoring campus peace, sorting out student

demands, and reuniting fiercely divided
fundamental and ominous signs. The
the smaller

numbers

faculties,

first

in the college-age

academic leaders missed even more

of these was simply the change in demography:

cohort of the population. The baby boomers had

passed through the pipeline; the baby-boom "echo" was fifteen years away. The second
indication lay in the public consequences of an older population: the

new

be

priority to

given the post-65-year-old cohort, the most rapidly growing group of dependents. The
third

was

inflation, resulting inescapably

from the way

in

which the Vietnam War had

been financed and from the emergence of genuine foreign competition

in

major sectors of

the U.S. economy. Rarely disposed to plan ahead in any event, academic administrators
still

had

their attention riveted

ceived the

new

By 1973, on

on getting through each week's

crisis,

and seldom per-

forces at work.

top of the

downswing

in the

economy, the effect of the new forces had been

further intensified by the recognition of resource scarcity— or, in Dennis

Meadow's

felici-

2
tous phrase, "the limits of growth." International economic problems proved unrespon-

sive to

wage or price freezes and

before the onslaught of the

a floating dollar; a full-blown recession followed.

OPEC energy crisis,

Even

the Keynesian consensus that the national

economy could be deftly managed to control business cycles was becoming unglued. "Stagflation" became a phenomenon economists had difficulty explaining.
Not

surprisingly, the political

in— puritanical,

mood

turned sour.

A strange Cromwellian spirit settled

simplistic, niggardly, mean-spirited, essentially anti-intellectual, basi-

Michael Dukakis campaigned on the promise of
somewhat naively on increased productivity from an executive
branch never known for its managerial competence or efficiency. Once in office, he
would face an apparently intractable deficit, and public education, midway through its
long-term capital outlay program, would be instructed to slash 30 percent from its outlays—operating expenses and capital. Healey's admonition that the bloom was off the rose
was painfully confirmed.

cally anti-institutional. In Massachusetts,

no new

taxes, relying

In October 1973, Gladys Hardy, former under secretary of education in Massachusetts,

submitted her

up the

interim report as director of the Public-Private Forum.

first

Hardy summed

situation in her classically understated way:

The venerable

privately sponsored institutions in Massachusetts felt the

economic

pinch and were sensitive to the dangerous ways in which competition might increase

between the public and private sectors
publicly sponsored institutions,

to the detriment of all higher education.

begun slowly and

The

late in receiving substantial invest-

ments, had not yet reached the goals of those investments and commitments of the 60's

and were sensitive to the potential of restraint on the realization of these objectives.

The System
In

Normal Accidents: Living

with High-Risk Technologies, a provocative treatment of

organization theory, Charles Perrow distinguishes between simple and complex systems

according to the number of their components and

how

they are coupled to one another, in

"loose" or "tight" ways. 3 In 1973, the Massachusetts higher education system clearly
qualified as

complex— many components,

loose couplings.

dent Colleges and Universities in Massachusetts

(AICUM)

The Association of Indepenthen had fifty-eight members,

ranging in nature from the great research universities, such as Harvard, to two-year junior
colleges, such as

Bay

Path.

tion during the expansive

The public system organized by

mood of the

the Willis-Harrington legisla-

mid-sixties ("let every college

bloom") consisted of

three universities, one with three campuses; twelve state colleges, most of which were in

from teacher-training institutes; and twelve newly
Each university and the two other segments were run by
separate, gubernatorially appointed boards of trustees. A Board of Higher Education
(BHE), composed of representatives of the public universities and colleges, one private
citizen, and a labor representative, presumably oversaw the public system.
By statute, the BHE was authorized to develop a master plan for higher education, to
the process of transforming themselves

established

community

colleges.

coordinate the programs of the public institutions, to approve

view budgetary requests. But the board

itself

new programs, and

to re-

never obtained from the legislature a budget

or staff that was sufficient to carry out these responsibilities. Further,

was viewed as biased toward the University of Massachusetts, and

its

its

early leadership

program and budget

reviews quickly became pro forma. Most public institutions simply ignored

its

pronounce-

ments.

The BHE's own

role

was compromised

in

1971 by the awkward presence of a secretary

of educational affairs, a position that had been established as part of an extensive reorganization of state government. This

and

to provide the

reform was designed

to streamline the executive

branch

governor with a cabinet that had line authority over previously quasi-

independent departments and agencies, tied together by a sophisticated computer-based
information system (which was never installed). 4

The

office of the secretary of educa-
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tional affairs

had been created apparently without considering the existence of the Board

of Higher Education, and the result was considerable duplication of statutory authority

and

memorandum by Paul Cooke, a Harvard Busiwho argued that the secretary's role was principally an advisory

responsibilities. Despite a thoughtful

ness School consultant

one, each body viewed the other with suspicion.

Both the private and public higher education systems then were "soft systems," the
each only loosely coupled together. They relied mainly on voluntary

institutions within

collaboration as they faced the hard problems that changing

demography and economic

recession imposed on them. Between the two sectors, collaboration was visible only at

where common curricula and student needs were obvious:
Lower Pioneer Valley; the Worcester Consortium for

specific geographical locations

the Five Colleges, Inc.

,

in the

Higher Education; the Southeastern Association for Cooperation

(SACHEM); and the Boston

Massachusetts

in

Higher Education

in

Eight.

The Boston Eight consisted of universities offering doctoral graduate programs in the
It came about on the initiative of three academic presidents:
Father Seavey Joyce of Boston College, Asa Knowles of Northeastern, and the author,
Boston metropolitan area.

then of the University of Massachusetts. Meeting periodically in the Captain's
the Algonquin Club, the Eight

managed

to publish a report

higher education to Boston's economy. After that, the exchange of views
personalities at close quarters
fell

made

for

Room at

on the contributions made by

among

strong

poor chemistry, and the tentative confederation

apart over the issue of federal aid to education.

Beset by conflicting demands from the public institutions and facing an experienced
professional, Joseph Cronin, as the first state secretary of educational affairs,
cellor Pat

three major studies

BHE chan-

The BHE and Secretary Cronin cosponsored
by recognized consultants: the Academy for Educational Development

McCarthy

called for outside help.

(AED), University Consultants, and the Organization

for Social

and Technical Innovation

(OSTI). Lacking real authority over either budget or planning, McCarthy could only hope
that

among academic

leaders presumably committed to rational thought, reason would

prevail as these empirical

mentation and disparity

and logical studies went forward. Actually, such was the frag-

among

public institutions that neither he nor Secretary Cronin

had any option.

The Public-Private Forum:

Don Schon,

an

(1)

MIT behavioral

The Beginnings

scientist,

was president of OSTI and the principal

investi-

BHE project titled "A Master Planning Process for Higher Education in
Massachusetts." A veteran evaluator of Great Society programs, Schon was process-

gator for a

oriented.

He believed that no

single master plan

would be able

to gain the support of all

the institutions affected. After collecting data about higher education in the state, and then

projecting trends, Schon advocated a "negotiation-bargaining" planning process, a proto-

type for efforts

1980 research
It

known

as public-private partnerships that

were

become fashionable

to

in

circles.

was under Schon's auspices

that the first three

took place, in February, March, and

May of

meetings of the Public-Private Forum

1973, and

it

was

his

agenda

that initially

shaped the Forum's work. Considerable preparatory work for both the public and private
sectors

was completed prior

times to determine

its

suspicions ran high.)

to the

February meeting. (Each sector met separately three

positions on policy issues that might arise. Obviously, sovereign

The Forum members present

10

at these

meetings were the Executive

Committee of AICUM, for the private sector, and the operating heads of the public uniand state and community colleges.
These early sessions provoked considerable claims throughout the higher education

versities

establishment, as well as considerable concern.

Forum could preempt the board's
campus
sector.

were suspicious

level

For

Members

of the

BHE worried that the

statutory authority. Public-segment executives at the

that their leaders

would "give the store away" to the private
Forum might be a stonewalling

their part, private institutions believed that the

device to allow public capital-outlay programs to go forward under the cover of deliber-

and debates. An exchange between Father John Brooks, presHoly Cross, and the author at the November 1973 meeting on the subject of
Brooks's proposal to freeze public capital-outlay appropriations was representative of
ately protracted discussions

ident of

some sharp questioning of motives and good faith that occurred in almost every session.
So was an exchange of letters in November and December 1973 between the author and
John Adam, then chairman of the BHE, over the same issue.
5

Given

this

atmosphere of suspicion, the Forum commissioned the author and President

to elaborate its form and functions. The two presidents were
They provided a set of guidelines and asserted that the collaborative effort was
essential, then went on to say it would be "inappropriate ... to recommend an ultimate

Burton Hallowell of Tufts
cautious.

organizational location." Further, they stressed that "the aegis of a lay decision-making
policy

body representing the

citizens' interest"

was

essential.

The principal aim of the

report was to lay to rest the image of an informal establishment elite bent on back-room

domination of higher education.

These early meetings of the Forum produced some workmanlike procedural results.
Four working bodies were formed: the Equal Opportunity Pool (EOP) group; the Committee on Graduate and Professional Education; the Student Aid Committee (later to be
combined with the Equal Opportunity Pool); and the Information Committee (planning

data and cost reporting).

During the summer of 1973, the committees went

to

work. Then, on November 12,

1973, a full-blown session, with twenty-five participants, took place at
lege. Its

Emmanuel Col-

purposes were to hear Schon's final report and the progress reports of the stand-

ing committees and to approve another committee on capital outlay. At the meeting

December

11, a

seven-person Executive Committee was established, with John

chair (thus removing

some of the BHE's concern about

on

Adam as

a competitive enterprise); the

member
Forum membership: five
one for AICUM, and one for the BHE.

secretary of educational affairs was invited to be on the committee as a nonvoting
(thus

damping

for public

his concern).

CEOs,

five for

Twelve votes were authorized

AICUM presidents,

for

Bylaws were drawn up, a mission statement was approved, and a three-quarters majority
vote was established as a prerequisite for Forum approval of any major policy.
With committees
assuaged, the

The Forum:

in place, structure

Forum appeared

(2)

to

be

and voting requirements established, and doubts

in business.

Hard Work and Tortured Consensus

Throughout the winter of 1973 and the spring of 1974, the Forum met monthly, alternating between private and public campus sites, where hospitality ranged from lavish spreads
of spirits and food to send-out sandwiches (on the occasion

mittee reports,

when

the host

Forum member

campus of the meeting). The sessions focused primarily on the comincreasingly on the report of the Equal Opportunity Pool Committee,

forgot to inform his

11

New England Journal of Public Policy

which was chaired by Peter Edelman, then vice president of the University of Massachusetts. This committee was charged with shaping a substantial financial aid program that

would be

fair to

both sectors. Essentially, the program turned on fixing a differential in

awards for financial aid between the two sectors, which would acknowledge the difference

between public and private

tuitions

and therefore allow students

to

make approximately

cost-neutral choices.

EOP debate was further complicated by technical considerations

The heavy

such as the

was also handicapped by the introduction of extraneous issues. For example, midway in the deliberations, Lawrence Dennis, CEO for the state College Board, announced a new "open university" program that
he was to oversee and that would report directly to the governor. Throughout February
and March of 1974 the debate went on, with Edelman providing successive revisions of its
calculation of federal aid, family support, and loans.

It

contents.

Then, during the meeting of April

Hazzard of Worcester Polytechnic

eloquent advocacy by President George

8, after

Forum adopted the EOP program and

Institute, the

agreed to seek gubernatorial and legislative support. The program totaled $35 million and
provided up to $2,000 for private-sector scholarships, capping public scholarships
$1,000 and guaranteeing that 80 percent of the
to the private sector. In

at

funds would be directed

Hazzard's opinion, the proposal "moved toward equalization" and

common front." On May 22,

deserved "a

total scholarship

the proposal incorporated in

Forum had the

1974, the

House No. 6094, with

satisfaction of seeing

a special message

recommending

it

by

Governor Francis Sargent. 6

The Forum:

High- Water

(3)

Mark—The Spirit of

Williamstown

By

the beginning of the

summer

of 1974, the

Forum was buoyed by

the production of a

tangible and important piece of legislation, by the presence of a senior staff

Gladys Hardy, and by a Ford Foundation grant

to

underwrite a

summer

member in

conference. (The

grant had been secured by Frank Tredinnick, executive director of AICUM, and by Father

Michael Walsh, then academic adviser
College

at a

At Williams

to the University of Massachusetts.)

three-day seminar in July 1974, the

Forum went

public. In fact, the seminar

was a summit meeting, carefully planned and structured by Hardy, Walsh, and Tredinnick.

It

brought together

all

the

Forum members, along with

eleven other presidents of

private and public institutions. Presidents John Silber of Boston University, John

dler of Williams, and Father
sector. President

Don Monan

Chan-

of Boston College were there for the private

Robert Leestamper of Worcester State College, President

Don Walker of

Southeastern Massachusetts University, and Dennis were major spokesmen for the public
sector. All but the

most amply endowed private

most anxious private and least-known public

Howard Bowen,

universities

institutions

were represented, and the

were there

in force.

known education economist, chaired the seminar. Fred
Permanent Charity Fund (now the Boston Fund), and Leroy Grea-

the nationally

Glimp, director of the

son, dean of Bowdoin, were rapporteurs.

A carefully prepared agenda began with initial

position papers by the author and Knowles,

moved

systematically through the major

is-

sues provoked by enrollment and financial trends, then concluded with a plenary session.
In the elegant

ambience of the Williams Elm Tree House, and prodded by

consistent with the

skillfully

common ground for public-private trade-offs that were
priorities of each sector. An Executive Committee meeting midway

persistent staff, the seminar found

12

down

through the seminar nailed

common

the specifics of a

statement, and the plenary

The two essential parts of the baramendment (Article 46), then pending

session offered a surprisingly eloquent endorsement.

Forum

gain were

support for the constitutional

before the voters, which would allow state aid for the private sector; and

ment

that

low tuition would continue for the public

Other provisions

in the

agree-

package were a commitment to planning that would be both

comprehensive and "open"

(that

is,

mation—a departure from
"no diversion" pledge to ensure

planning

which the two sectors would share

in

past procedure); support for the

a

that private aid

real

infor-

EOP pending legislation;

would not reduce support

But these were good-will generalities. The

institutions.

Forum

sector.

and

to the public

agreement was an exercise

in

distributive politics— both sectors anticipating increments to their resource positions

heretofore denied them.

John

Adam

that the

1 1

expressed the delight and surprise of all participants

"tone or

when he wrote on July

and feelings," and concrete written agreement

spirit," "attitudes

represented a "landmark in the development of public-private cooperation." The

all

mem-

bers departed aglow with the spirit of Williamstown.

The Forum:
The glow

(4)

Committees

in

Trouble and Purple Prose

1974 academic summer, and the two autumn meetings
become Forum chairman. The body reviewed its mission and

lasted throughout the

went well. Glimp agreed
reaffirmed

its

to

independence; and

it

was gratified by a reaffirmation of support from the

BHE. It also began to benefit from frank, informal exchanges, in the discussion of
AICUM's forthcoming legislative program and in the debate over contrary proposals for
veterinary medical education. (The Forum ultimately endorsed the contract plan of the

New England Land Grant Universities,
senior staff transition from
lege,

Hardy

to

instead of a free-standing veterinary school.)

A

Henry Kriebel, president emeritus of Babson Col-

went well.

But trouble loomed regarding the work of the Committee on Graduate and Professional
Education and the Information Committee. In 1974, Dean Robert Alberty of MIT, chair of
the

Committee on Graduate and Professional Education, had reported

difficulty in obtaining reliable information, especially in engineering.

the committee's

He had distributed

a questionnaire to participating institutions. Returns had been few. Now, on
1975, his committee

made no

groups be established

Forum discharged

to

March

25,

substantive recommendations and suggested that regional

review new graduate programs proposed by any institution. The

the committee with thanks.

The Information Committee was

in

deeper

Gulko, director of institutional research

difficulty.

at the

Under the leadership of Warren

University of Massachusetts at Amherst,

it

had embarked on an ambitious and technically complex analysis involving comparative
cross-institutional costs of individual

academic departments. The study cost money, and

Forum members— Silber and
Monan of Boston College especially — had raised questions both as to design and
And there was general apprehension on the part of private institutions about dis-

$16,000 was scrounged from various college budgets. But
Father
utility.

closing financial information.
Further, the Information

Committee found

it

difficult to apply national statistical for-

mats such as the Higher Educational General Information Survey (HEGIS)
chusetts scene. Problems of definition

hampered

participating institutions to report promptly. 7 In

13

its

to the

Massa-

work. So did the failure of

March

this

committee was also

dis-

New England Journal of Public Policy

charged with thanks, although

in

June 1975 the Forum was to try again by authorizing a

$9,000 study by Newhauser, Frantz, and Corsirie, to be completed by October 1975. That

work

also foundered as a result of difficulty with the data. Without tangible substantive

recommendations from these committees, the Forum

warned
the

that

it

was "precious, though

fragile

letter

both the

to

marked

time.

be disappearing. Hardy had

and tenuous." Now, on November

BHE recommended higher public tuitions,

sharp

essentially

seemed

In the meantime, the spirit of Williamstown

and on December

15, 1974,

18, the author

wrote a

of protest to McCarthy, complaining that the board's action was contrary "to

spirit

and the specific recommendations of the Williamstown meeting." Kriebel

observed diplomatically
"the quality of the

in his final report

Forum meetings has

the agenda has a substantial bearing

momentum,

the

of April 18, 1975, as his contract expired, that

not been consistent" and that "the composition of

on the quality of the meeting." Seeking

Forum ventured another Williamstown-style meeting,

this

to regain

time

at

Holy

Cross, on April 29, 1975.

As

Williamstown, the Holy Cross meeting was sponsored by the Ford Foundation,

in

but this time the meeting did not work. For one thing,
for another, almost

one hundred CEOs,

and

trustees,

it

was only a day in duration, and
were involved. Father Walsh

staff

gave a splendid address, and T. Edward Hollander, deputy commissioner from
reported on that state's experience, emphasizing the institutional aid that the

money"

provided.

He deemed

it

essential that higher education speak with

A question-and-answer period ensued,
Walsh called

for a master plan, but

The Forum:

(5)

New

York,

"Bundy

"one voice." 8

followed by a press conference at the end. Father

no formal statement was issued.

Disaster at Worcester

After the Holy Cross meeting, the paper

trail

of Forum activities largely disappears.

Kriebel executed the cost study contract, and in October 1975 the contractors reported
their inability to establish reliable

comparisons.

By December,

the

AICUM files focused

almost exclusively on correspondence with the Ford Foundation, in which an effort was
being

made to

reconcile expense vouchers. There are references to an occasional meeting

of the Executive Committee in Adam's offices in Worcester. But there

agendas or of full Forum assemblies,

is

no report of any

Ken Ryder, newly appointed president of Northeastern, did host a meeting at Henderson House in the winter of 1975. No
if

they were held.

minutes of the meeting emerged because, as Ryder

The drop-off in recorded
agenda

at

Holy Cross was

to discover

launched, with the necessary data

The

real, if

available

and competent professional staff as-

BHE nor Ford Foundation funding

available.

Meanwhile, the economic and

political

OPEC oil crisis were everywhere,

environment had worsened. The effects of the

as inflation quickened and fuel costs threatened the

budget of every campus. The Dukakis administration persevered
across-the-board cuts in funding for public higher education.

rium

to record."

somewhat hidden,

whether a genuine master-plan effort could be

made

signed. That issue had not been resolved, and neither

was now

"There was nothing

recalls,

activity is not surprising.

for the

opening of the new medical school

capital-outlay funds for such projects as a

facilities at

new gymnasium

It

in trying to

impose

also proposed a morato-

Worcester, and impounded
at the

Boston campus of the

University of Massachusetts. Scholarship funds were cut, and private and public institutions alike

were engaged

economic survival.
became preoccupied with fighting off Governor Duka-

in struggles for

Increasingly, the public sector
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—

kis's austerity

proposals and what

it

perceived to be a frontal attack on fiscal autonomy.

The BHE and the new state secretary of educational affairs, Paul Parks, seemed more and
more to behave like two scorpions occupying the same bottle. Chancellor McCarthy of the

BHE departed for Maine,

and other public

CEOs

slipped away. Finally, the public sector,

with the support of Senate president Kevin Harrington, undertook a major reorganization
of its structure, aiming to distance

itself

from gubernatorial direction and

strong central board with genuine budgeting and planning authority.

By

to establish a

early spring of

1976, the fight for the reorganization against gubernatorial opposition was consuming

most of the public

sector's

energy and attention. 9

Nonetheless, through the good offices of Glimp,

mined

Adam, and Tredinnick, it was deterOn March 26, 1976, forty-six

one more major effort should be made.

that at least

CEOs and their staff assembled at the Worcester Medical
as

turned

it

out, in the surgical amphitheater.

Center, appropriately enough,

The aim was

cifics of a master plan: what the plan would be,

to

who would

come

write

to grips with the spe-

it,

and how

it

would be

financed. Shortly after the meeting began, however, President Silber of Boston University

made an eloquent

but intemperate defense of the independence of the private sector, and

From the floor, PresiCommunity College and Chancellor Bromery of the University of

attacked the wastefulness and redundancy of the public institutions.

dent Bartley of Holyoke

Massachusetts

at

Amherst responded

in kind.

technical cost discussion, producing

Charges and countercharges resounded

The meeting bogged down in yet another
more glazed eyes than conclusive articulation. The

through the amphitheater with growing

intensity.

opportunity to present a specific policy proposal vanished.
Instead, the

ened

BHE,

CEOs in attendance issued a seven-point statement calling for a strength-

with

more

private representation, and suggesting that the role of the secretary

of educational affairs be "reexamined."
tion

The statement encouraged "voluntary" coopera-

and coordination but through regional and area consortia, and sought

between lay-board governance and the planning function.

Its

to distinguish

only specific positions were

a defense of the fiscal autonomy of state institutions and a declaration that "neither the
executive branch nor elected officials should have line authority in the governance of

higher education."

Not a
what

it

single resolution

emerged concerning the

role of the Public-Private

Forum or

should do next. The attendees simply straggled out, to repair in cliques and

caucuses

at

Analysis:

nearby bars and restaurants. The

Forum did not meet again.

What Went Wrong?

The Forum achieved consensus on two significant policy matters— the EOP and the Williamstown agreement. Why, then, did the undertaking ultimately fail? As one sifts
through the record, two sets of answers suggest themselves: internal and external. Generally speaking, internally the relative strengths of the

much

two sectors were uneven, not so

in the aggregate as in the respective positions of universities, liberal arts colleges,

and two-year

institutions. Externally, the

ronment

(as did the other states), but also

one with

little

Forum faced not only
an especially adverse

tradition for recognizing the

autonomy of any

a difficult economic envipolitical

environment

institutions that sought

substantial public resources.

In elaborating

on the internal properties of the Massachusetts education system, one

observes the following. First, the sheer number of institutions and their diverse character

made

a coherent structure hard to

come by. Approximately
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eighty separate private institu-
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tions existed in Massachusetts in the 1970s, each with

committed

to institutional survival.

its

own board

of trustees and each

Twenty-five public universities and colleges were

involved. Their character and quality varied wildly, not only in the two-year/ four-year/

graduate divisions, but in special foci, origin, and sponsorship. To engage them

all, or,

more important, to have each perceive that its interests were being fairly represented in
the Forum would have been an extraordinarily difficult achievement of statesmanship
even

in

prosperous times.

T Edward Hollander had
Holy Cross. More than other states, Massachusetts draws a large proporstudents from out of state. The more prestigious the college or university, the

Second, the private sector had special characteristics, as
pointed out
tion of
less

it

its

at

depends upon either public or private

state resources.

So Harvard, MIT, Amherst,

Williams had no direct concern with the Forum's condition, save
Indeed, the experience of the Boston Eight

made plain

that the

in a public relations way.

heavy

hitters tolerated the

game only as long as it seemed pleasant. When they withdrew, they suffered no consequences. The active private participants in the Forum were the hungry universities. They
were frequently of high

made up

clout, they

meant a great deal

quality, but state aid

with the public sector was very real.

tition

What these

to

them, and their compe-

institutions lacked in prestige

and

in contentiousness.

Third, the public sector was in no better shape. Operating at the end of the Great Leap
Forward decade, its segments were designed to operate independently, preoccupied with
completing major expansions for which the commitment in bricks and mortar had already

been made. Most important, public-sector

institutions suffered from a historical inferiorcomplex vis-a-vis their private counterparts. In actuality, the public community colleges were in far better circumstances than the private junior colleges, and the University
ity

of Massachusetts was achieving national status. But their administrations found
believe in themselves. This second-best attitude
their

made them

it

street fighters too, as

hard to

much

as

hungry private counterparts.

Fourth, this complicated, weak, and loose array of institutions functioned with an ap-

The experience of the InformaCommittee demonstrated how crude and error-prone the data base for policy-making
was, and few institutions had competent planning staffs. Throughout the Forum's existence, the simple absence of facts plagued its deliberations and encouraged judgments
based on rumor, false assumptions, and vague generalizations. The presence of two able
senior staff directors could not compensate for this fundamental deficiency.
As for characteristics of the external environment, the "outside" political system was
palling lack of knowledge about themselves or each other.
tion

ill-disposed to support higher education, especially public higher education, for several

reasons. First, the coordinating

composition of the
institutions

authority;

mechanisms

that existed

were flawed and redundant. The

BHE was heavily weighted toward the public sector,

and the private

both resented and were suspicious of the board. Further, the board had no real

it

could review, comment, and

not mandate them.

recommend programs and budgets,

When the office of the

but

it

could

secretary of educational affairs was introduced

as an extraneous by-product of the statewide reorganization plan, confusion and uncertainty

were compounded. The

injunction of consultant Paul

first secretary,

Cooke

Joseph Cronin, appeared often to heed the

to function in

an advisory and consultative fashion,

but his successor, Paul Parks, showed no such disposition. If ever there was a fifth wheel
in

governmental structure,

it

and the office was abolished

was the secretary's office. (This mistake was acknowledged,
1979 reorganization legislation for higher education.)

in the
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Second, the higher education system never achieved genuine autonomy with respect to
the larger state political system.

resources, nor was

it

The

private sector

was never

really

dependent on public

critically influential in the political process, for

financial disclosure, a prerequisite for institutional aid.

It

it

always resisted

sometimes had marginal

influ-

ence, as with scholarship programs, but on major issues such as the establishment of a

won considerable statutory autonomy
autonomy turned on legislative sufferance usually evident in nonacademic patronage accommodations. Some governors exercised selfrestraint in trustee appointments, but by the mid-seventies, that restraint had vanished; in
its place, a conscious strategy of oversight and control had emerged.
Third, the severe economic recession, the energy shortage, and the faltering public
faith in the value of higher education encouraged and magnified media cynicism. This was
expressed in such headlines as "College: Who Needs It?" and served to create a mood of
growing pessimism. Educators were no longer respected public figures. They were adstate

medical school,

it

lost.

The public

sector had

in the sixties, but the continuation of that

vised by their business and political counterparts to "hunker down," not to

not to

make waves,

try.

Fourth, both the public and the private educational institutions tended to align themselves with broader political ideologies,
to the

common cause.

which led

to confrontational postures not relevant

Public educators often preached a populist doctrine, portraying

themselves as the guarantors of education for the

"common people" and offering

to the first-generation college-bound. Private educators often
that their institutions

were superior

in

access

responded by suggesting

terms of quality and purity of motives. In the

speeches and behavior of both, one could detect the ghosts of the Jefferson-Hamilton
debates.

Contemporary

political analysis categorizes public policies in four ways: constitutional

(changing the rules of the game); regulatory (imposing restraints on individual or collective behavior); distributive (providing benefits to a majority);

and redistributive (provid-

ing benefits to one group at the cost of another). Clearly, as a voluntary, consensus-based,

and confederate organization, the Forum could not aspire
policy. It

ful interest

forces at

to constitutional or regulatory

could— and did— advance distributive policy, functioning
group

that could influence but not

work within

mandate public

as a potentially power-

policy.

Given the centrifugal

the higher educational system (lacking the cohesion

and discipline

of an industry association or a trade union) and the centripetal forces of the outside
cal

omy), redistributive policy-making was beyond the Forum's
too

politi-

system (the gubernatorial drive for dominance engendered by a deteriorating econcapability. It

was one bridge

far.

Put another way, as long as the public and private sectors in education regarded themselves as

more dissimilar than

alike, they

they could negotiate only treaties.

could negotiate, as Schon urged them to do, but

They did so

in the

EPO program and at Williamstown.

In these instances, each party expected to gain in an anticipated distribution of additional

resources—joint scholarships, a constitutional amendment for the private sector, continued low tuition for the public sector. This was akin to incremental budgeting, a non-zero-

sum game.

A treaty could be made.

However, when the two sectors were asked to agree to a master plan that assigned

dis-

and a reallocation of resources, the load became too heavy to carry. True
enough, the Forum entered a partial no man's land, created by an ineffective BHE and a
crete missions

loose-cannon secretary's office, but occupying that territory required a disciplined force
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engage

to

This

up

is

to

So

in redistributive policies, in

hard times taking from one and giving to another.

the hardest kind of politics to play, and

not surprising that the

it is

Forum was

not

it.

at

Worcester, the sectors parted

hand, the

Forum asked

company

in a

curiously inconsistent way.

On the one

the larger political systems to undertake the redistributive task

through a stronger lay board.

On the other hand,

it

argued for grassroots voluntary re-

gionalism, apparently assuming that things would go better at the local level even though

resources were

more

scarce.

The Forum was unanimous only

cians to keep their hands off its precious,

would be
Accordingly, two years

if

in its

admonition to

fragmented, enterprises.

politi-

No politician,

espe-

cially in Massachusetts,

likely to take that counsel as anything but a confession

of failure.

later, in

act, the

an off-budget section of the

Lessons for

Our Times

Ten years after the demise of the Forum, the environment
chusetts

is

sharply different.

The flood

once again on the public agenda,

that a

decade of being shut. Massachusetts
lay

state appropriations

Board of Regents was established.

board

is

is

for higher education in

window of opportunity has been opened after a
booming economically, and a powerful education

in place. Ironically, the issue of private-public representation is

This circumstance

is

made plain by

Massa-

tide of reports indicates that higher education is

now

reversed.

the aftermath of James Collins's appointment and by

the legislative override of Governor Dukakis's veto of the

new

conflict-in-interest law.

10

What is intriguing in the present situation is that the arena for resolving in-house competition among public and private educational institutions is now the Board of Regents. Absent a public-private forum, there is nowhere else for that issue to go. What the Forum
protested against, even as it dissolved, is now reality.
Could a reconstituted Forum recapture that arena on the grounds that academic
autonomy and independence are at risk today, to the detriment of both public and private
and colleges? The contemporary experience of five other states offers at least

universities

a partial answer.
In 1985, the Association of Governing Boards of Universities

and Colleges (AGB) stud-

ied patterns of collaboration in Pennsylvania, Illinois, Maryland,

North Carolina, and

New York— and found the prospects encouraging. The AGB's special report,
and

Conflict:

The Public and Private Sectors

historically there have

been more shared

out that in the eighties, far

more than

in

Higher Education, observes

interests

Cooperation

first that

and values than differences."

It

points

they did in the seventies, both sectors rely on the

same three major sources of institutional funding: fees, gifts and endowments, and federal
state aid. Both have the same interest in federal and state tax codes. Sabers continue to

and

rattle, the

report states, as in the half-cost battle with federal Pell grants, but the danger of

a preemptive strike by one sector or another seems to have diminished in the past ten years.
Specifically, after presenting the five case studies, the

AGB suggests that well-struc-

tured, well-staffed, joint state associations can successfully advance

programs, and have done

so.

This

is

common funding

the so-called linkage strategy of tying support for

private institutions to a percentage of public appropriations, thereby ensuring a rising tide
to float all boats.

Such

state associations

agreements among each other, as
centers and in the Illinois

can engage and have engaged in contractual

Ben Franklin Partnership in high-tech regional
Higher Education Cooperative Act. They can cooperate and
in the
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.

have clearly cooperated on student financial aid. These policies seem transferable to
Massachusetts.
Finally, the

AGB recommends that lay governing boards recognize the importance of

intersector relations

and

that all parties seek the

12
sending out "hard ball" signals.

tions of higher education

It

"high road" of cooperation instead of

suggests that boards should encourage state associa-

and enhance support of their

endorses the linkage

activities. It

formula for appropriations, anticipating that private institutions will have to acknowledge
general oversight of their programs. Observing candidly that the possibility of civil war
exists, the association

Given the
Regents

goes on to opt for the

AGB guidelines,

is still

civility

of enlightened self-interest.

perhaps Massachusetts should try again. While the Board of

struggling to organize itself and define

its

role, the

presence of a public-

forum as a coherent, consistent voice for higher education could be a powerful
factor in the formation of sound education policy. Such a forum would remain, of course,
an interest group, however enlightened and deserving. But it could be a knowledgeable
private

initiator

of a sound distributive policy, and

it

could provide a determined buffer against

inappropriate intervention from the external political system. In the present circumstances, with the lessons of the past taken to heart

structure acknowledged, a public-private

and the deficiencies of the current

forum might again invoke the

town, and this time the enterprise might succeed.

spirit

of Williams-

*•>
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